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The threat facing the U.S. Navy is changing from 
engagement in blue water to combat in the littorals.  In order 
to meet this threat, the U.S. Navy built the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) — a high speed, shallow draft, focused-mission 
platform capable of operating independently, as a squadron, 
or as part of a Carrier/Expeditionary Strike Group (CSG/
ESG).1   As with every new platform, many questions 
regarding the employment of LCS are still  unanswered. 
How many LCS should comprise a squadron?   What mix of 
mission packages should be employed within the squadron? 
Previous research has addressed the above questions using 
data farming techniques (i.e., Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercubes (NOLH)) with an agent based model called Map 
Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA).  Simulating over 
40,000 littoral engagements in three warfare areas, Surface 
Warfare (SUW), Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), and Mine 
Warfare (MIW), LT Abbott showed that a squadron of six to 
ten LCSs and a compositional rule of thumb of five LCSs 
configured for  the primary threat and two configured for a 
secondary threat produced lower blue casualties while 
increasing red casualties.2   This research, however, did not 
take into consideration the use of tactics by the red force. 
Team 2 investigated the impact of red force tactics on the 
results found in LT Abbott’s research. 
Description of Scenarios
The three warfare areas analyzed in the original research 
were each given a scenario to model the use of an employed 
LCS squadron:
• In the SUW scenario, a squadron of LCS is used to 
clear a choke point of a missile boat threat in advance 
of a CSG; enemy submarines may also be present.
• In the ASW scenario, a squadron of LCS is used to 
clear a strait of submarines which may be protected by 
missile boats.
• In the MIW scenario, a squadron of LCS must detect 
and neutralize a mine field that is blocking a  shipping 
lane and may be guarded by missile boats.
No alterations were made to the scenarios of the original 
research with the exception of placement of the red forces.
MODELING
In order to maintain integrity with the original work, design 
points meeting the recommendations (i.e., squadron size of 
six to ten, and mission package mix) were selected from each 
warfare area.  This produced 16 design points for the SUW 
scenario, 14 for the ASW scenario, and 19 for  the MIW 
scenario.  Figure 1 shows the design points used for the SUW 
scenario. Since the focus is on tactics, the parameters of the 
design points were not changed nor were the personality 
weightings in MANA for the blue or red forces.  
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Figure 1:  Design points used in the SUW scenario
Placement of the red forces, however, were changed to 
simulate different tactics that a red force may employ.  For 
each scenario, two tactics were created through red teaming 
by Team 2, which were then replicated 30 times across each 
design point.  Table 1 summarizes the red tactics Team 2 
created for use in the simulation. 
Scenario Red Tactic One Red Tactic Two
SUW
Submarines form a barrier 
at the mouth of the choke 
point.  Missile boats 
unchanged.
Missile boats are assembled 
in a U-shaped formation just 
south of the submarines.  
Submarines unchanged.
ASW
Submarines are placed in 
four separate boxes in a 
cross like pattern.  Missile 
boats unchanged.
Missile boats are placed in 
the center of the channel to 
the north of the ubmarines.  
MIW
Missile boats are placed in 
front of the mine field to 
prevent detection.  Mines 
unchanged.
Missile boats are split into 
two elements, one placed in 
front of and one behind the 
mine field.  Mines 
unchanged.
Table 1:  Red tactics determined by Team 2
Figure 2 shows a screen shot of the MIW scenario at 
problem start with the original research placement and red 
tactics illustrated.
Figure 2:  Screen shot of MIW scenario at problem start
RESULTS
After simulating over 1400 littoral operations, the results of 
each tactic per warfare area were compared to the data 
provided by the original research.  In order to grasp the 
significance of red tactics, the Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) chosen by the team are percent of LCS killed and 
percent of red killed.  In the MIW and ASW areas, minor 
variations in the MOEs were observed and the results of the 
original work were confirmed—specifically LCS operating in 
areas where there are more than ten enemy submarines. 
Figure 3 shows the comparison of the results for ASW area.
The SUW area showed minor variations in percent of 
LCS killed, but instances of large increases in percentage of 
red killed.  This was due to the ability of the SUW LCS to 
engage the missile boats while crossing the submarine screen. 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the impact of the different tactics on 
the blue and red forces for the SUW scenario.
Figure 3:  Comparison of the results for the ASW scenario
Figure 4:  Minor variations in LCS casualties 
were observed in the SUW scenario
Figure 5:  SUW scenario shows large increases 
in percentage of red killed
CONCLUSIONS
The results obtained by Team 2 solidify the original research 
and illustrates the power of data farming—conducting over 
40,000 replications provides insight over a large spectrum. 
These results also suggest that MANA indirectly models 
tactics for both blue and red forces, when the agents are not 
assigned waypoints and required to follow them closely. 
This is due to MANA’s re-seeding at each replication causing 
agents to start in different locations within their  assigned 
home.  As they follow their personalities they loosely apply 
many variations of tactics.  Further research can be 
conducted on the impact of changing the personality 
weightings of both blue and red forces, as well as the use of 
Automated Red Teaming (ART) and other evolutionary 
algorithms in determining tactics for both forces.
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